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THE COST OF THE U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM REVISITED
JOHN C. BEGHIN, BARBARA EL OSTA, JAY R. CHERLOW, and SAMARENDU MOHANTY*
The article analyzes the welfare cost of the U.S. sugar program using a multimarket
model of U.S. sweetener markets. The latter includes raw crops, sugar extraction and
refining, and sweetener users (food-processing industries and final consumers). The
authors address the industrial organization of food industries using sweeteners and
treat the United States as a large importer. With the removal of the program, this
article estimates (all figures in 1999 dollars) that in 1998 cane growers, sugar beet
growers, and processors would have lost $307, $650, and $89 million, respectively;
sweetener users would have gained $1.9 billion. World prices would have increased
by 13.2%. The deadweight loss of the program is estimated at $532 million. (JEL
Q18, Q17, F13)
I. INTRODUCTION
The sugar program has used farm com-
modity and trade policy instruments to
maintain domestic sugar prices at levels
that exceed world prices without requiring
the government to buy large quantities of
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domestic sugar in most years.1 This article
analyzes the effects of eliminating the sugar
program on prices, production, and welfare
using a multimarket model of the domestic
and world sweetener markets. Here are esti-
mated the economic welfare effects of the
program by assessing welfare losses and gains
resulting from the elimination of the sugar
program as an estimate of the gains (losses)
accruing to each group potentially affected
by the presence of the program. This analysis
includes the U.S. markets for sugar beet and
sugarcane production, corn and high-fructose
corn syrup (HFCS) production, sugar refin-
ing, food processing, and the final consump-
tion of sugar and food products containing
sweeteners. This domestic model is embed-
ded into a world sugar model to estimate the
1. Large quantities of sugar were forfeited to the
government in 2000 and 2001 because of large imports
from Mexico and larger-than-expected domestic supply.
ABBREVIATIONS
AMS: Aggregate Measure of Support
CARD: Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation
CRS: Congressional Research Service
GAO: General Accounting Office
HFCS: High-Fructose Corn Syrup
TRQ: Tariff Rate Quota
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture
WTO: World Trade Organization
106
BEGHIN ET AL.: U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM 107
impact of the U.S. sugar program on world
prices of sugar. In addition, the net loss to
the U.S. economy (economic welfare gains
minus losses) resulting from artificially high
sweetener prices is estimated. This net loss
includes economic inefficiencies (deadweight
losses) and economic rent transfers to foreign
sugar exporters.
The analysis deals explicitly with three
issues that often have been raised in the con-
text of U.S. sugar policy but never addressed
simultaneously in previous work (Congres-
sional Research Service [CRS], 2001; Koo,
forthcoming; Marks and Maskus, 1993; Sum-
ner, 1999; U.S. General Accounting Office
[GAO], 1993). First is the recognition that
the United States is a large country in the
world sugar market and that U.S. policy
changes affect the import price of sugar.
The second focus of this analysis relates to
the linkage between sugar market prices and
prices paid by the consumer for goods con-
taining sugar. The price of sugar influences
the cost and price of sweetener-intensive food
items and creates a pass-through effect of
the sugar program on processed food to con-
sumers. Third, the article considers imperfect
competition and profit in food processing.
The eventuality of a profit markup influences
the extent of the pass-through of sweetener
costs to consumers and therefore the distribu-
tion and size of the welfare gains from remov-
ing the sugar program.2
The authors estimate (all figures in 1999
dollars) that with the removal of the pro-
gram, U.S. cane growers, sugar beet grow-
ers, and beet processors in 1998 would have
lost about $307 million, $650 million, and $89
million, respectively. Sweetener users would
have gained about $1.9 billion. The dead-
weight loss of the current sugar program
for 1998 was estimated at around $532 mil-
lion, and the net loss to the U.S. economy
was $893 million. World sugar prices would
increase by 13.2% with the removal of the
U.S. sugar program. The magnitude of these
aggregate gains is relatively insensitive to
changes in assumptions regarding the indus-
trial organization of the food industry, the
extent of price pass-through, and the time
2. The authors do not investigate the existence of
price-cost markup per se but analyze the implications of
the eventuality of a markup. Markup estimates are bor-
rowed from the empirical industrial organization litera-
ture (Bhuyan and Lopez, 1997).
horizon considered. However, these assump-
tions affect the distribution of gains within
sweetener users (food industry, final con-
sumers). This point is elaborated later.
Several motivations underlie this inves-
tigation. First, the divergence of interests
between the domestic coalition of sugar crop
growers and raw cane processors on one
side and cane refiners and food proces-
sors on the other has been rapidly widening
with the recent increasing disparity between
domestic and world raw cane prices. Sec-
ond, the U.S. sugar program is a dispro-
portionate contributor to the aggregate mea-
sure of support (AMS) monitored by the
World Trade Organization (WTO) under
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agricul-
ture. Among U.S. farmers, sugar produc-
ers received the highest policy transfer (in
percentage of crop value) for the policies
falling under the scrutiny of the WTO in the
so-called amber box. The 1998–2000 average
AMS for sugar was equal to 50% of crop
value, compared to an average of 7% for all
crops during this period (Hart and Babcock,
2001). The Doha round of WTO negotia-
tions has just started, and the domestic pol-
icy debate regarding the 2002 farm bill is
emphasizing compliance with existing WTO
limits on trade distorting subsidies. The two
policies are now more interdependent than
ever because of increased WTO pressures to
lower these limits in the Doha Round (Sum-
ner, 2000). Hence, it is propitious to revisit
the social cost of such large transfers and dis-
tortions in the double context of the changing
political economy of the sugar program and
the ongoing debates on farm and trade policy
reforms.
The U.S. sugar program has been repeat-
edly analyzed over the years, because it not
only has evolved but also resisted trade lib-
eralization and has become one of the last
bastions of protectionism in U.S. agriculture.
Examples of recent analyses of distortions in
the U.S. and world sugar markets include
Boyd et al. (1996), Haley (1998), Koo (forth-
coming), Marks and Maskus (1993), Sheales
et al. (1999), and Wohlgenant (1999). These
studies combine various degrees of sophisti-
cation in their assessment of the U.S. sugar
program and its impact on world markets
and in their treatment of sweetener demand
by food processing and final consumers. This
article’s comprehensive approach is a novel
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and useful complement to these previous
studies.
In the next sections, the authors first pro-
vide a description of the U.S. sugar pro-
gram and the policy scenario considered. An
overview of our modeling approach follows.
Results and conclusions complete the article.
An appendix, available on request, provides a
detailed description of this U.S. sugar model,
including the approach used to estimate wel-
fare gains and losses for participants in the
various affected markets. This appendix then
describes the data and data sources used
in this analysis. Finally, the appendix briefly
describes the world sugar model used to
assess the impact of the U.S. sugar program
on world markets.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE U.S.
SUGAR PROGRAM
The sugar program functions as a price
floor mechanism by guaranteeing sugar pro-
ducers a minimum price by offering them
loans at a rate established by law, which is
shared with beet and cane farmers. This sys-
tem of price support is made possible by tight
trade barriers imposed on imports of sugar
via a set of bilateral tariff rate quotas (TRQs)
managed by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA). The out-of-quota imports are
taxed at a prohibitive tariff rate, which pre-
cludes importing more than the TRQ. For
most years, imports are managed such that
the U.S. market prices of raw cane sugar
and beet sugar remain above the loan rate
level, so the USDA does not have to buy
up sugar forfeited under the loan program
(U.S. GAO, 1999). In 2000, however, out-
of-quota sugar imports originating in Mexico
combined with a large domestic supply led to
sugar forfeitures of about 800,000 short tons
(CRS, 2001). WTO commitments constrain
the USDA’s efforts to tighten sugar imports,
and forfeitures may occur whenever domes-
tic supply is large. The U.S. sugar industry is
challenging Mexican imports (USDA, 1999;
Buzzanell, 1999).
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996—the 1996 farm bill—
modified the sugar program without funda-
mentally decreasing the support received by
growers. Six changes and key features were to
(1) legislatively retain the USDA’s 1995 loan
rate levels for the 1996–2001 period of 18
cents per pound for raw cane sugar and 22.9
cents per pound for refined beet sugar, (2)
assess a new 1-cent penalty on each pound
for raw cane sugar and a 1.07-cent penalty
on each pound of refined beet sugar forfeited
to the government, (3) eliminate a require-
ment that the sugar program operate at no
net cost to the federal government, (4) limit
processors’ opportunities to forfeit sugar to
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
by not allowing forfeitures if the TRQ is 1.5
million tons or less, (5) eliminate the USDA’s
authority to impose marketing allotments for
sugar, and (6) increase the assessment on
processors by 25% to 0.2475 cent per pound
for raw cane sugar and 0.2654 cent per pound
for beet sugar (U.S. GAO, 2000). The lat-
ter measure was suspended for fiscal year
2000/01, saving the producing industry about
$83 million (CRS, 2001).
According to the 1996 farm bill, when
USDA sets the TRQ level at or below 1.5
million tons, loans made through the CCC
are recourse in nature (forfeiting the crop
pledged as collateral to the CCC to repay
the loan is not allowed). Congress repealed
this authority to make recourse loans in
its 2001 agriculture appropriation measures
(CRS, 2001). For years when the TRQ is set
higher than 1.5 million tons, loans made to
the CCC are nonrecourse in nature (the loan
provides processors the option of forfeiting
the sugar pledged on their CCC loan instead
of repayment). This option becomes impor-
tant to processors if domestic sugar prices
drop below the USDA’s loan rate plus trans-
portation and interest costs but minus the
1-cent-per-pound penalty (U.S. GAO, 2000).
Including CCC outlays related to sugar stocks
would increase the estimates of the social
cost of the sugar program. For instance, net
CCC outlays (loans minus repayments) were
$465.5 million in 2000. Removing the sugar
program would eliminate these net outlays.
III. POLICY REFORM SCENARIO
The policy scenario for this analysis
removes the TRQs for imported raw and
refined sugar and the USDA’s loan program
for sugar processors that supports the price
of domestic sugar (see Moschini, 1991, for
a discussion of the economics of the TRQ).
Figure 1 shows the effects of removing both
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FIGURE 1
Effects of Removing the TRQ and the USDA’s Loan Program on U.S. Prices and Quantities
of Raw Sugar
the raw sugar TRQ and the USDA’s loan pro-
gram: panel (a) represents the domestic raw
sugar market; panel (b) represents the world
raw sugar market faced by the United States.
In panel (b), two rest-of-the-world excess
supply situations, ES1 and ES2, correspond-
ing to different trade scenarios, are shown.
In the presence of a TRQ, the United States
faces a kinked rest-of-the-world excess sup-
ply function, as in the bold line ABCD on
ES1. The vertical line segment BC on ES1
represents the level of the TRQ, below and
beyond which there is a supply response to
price by foreign exporters. Moreover, below
the level of the quota, QTRQ, the in-quota tar-
iff applies; beyond that level, the out-of-quota
tariff applies. The excess supply curve ES2
corresponds to the rest-of-the-world excess
supply in the absence of import restrictions in
the United States. The effect of the TRQ on
U.S. imports and prices depends on the loca-
tion of the U.S. excess demand for imports
relative to the excess supply.
Panel (b) displays three potential U.S.
import demand situations, ED1, ED2, and
ED3. The excess demand curve ED1 rep-
resents the U.S. import demand below
the level of the TRQ, whereas the excess
demand curve ED3 represents the U.S.
import demand above the level of the TRQ.
At excess demand ED2, the TRQ is binding.
Price and quantity reach equilibrium at the
intersection of the U.S. excess demand curve
ED2 and the kinked rest-of-the-world excess
supply curve ES1 perceived by U.S. importers
on its vertical segment BC.
With the removal of the TRQ, increased
world imports of raw cane sugar drive down
domestic prices. At the same import demand,
this situation corresponds to a new equilib-
rium level: the point where ED2 intersects
ES2, the rest-of-world excess supply curve
without import restrictions, with increased
U.S. import demand QFM.
Because of the USDA’s loan program for
sugar processors, however, domestic prices
would still not be free to drop to the world
price level. Under the loan program, pro-
ducers would still be eligible to forfeit their
sugar to the government and receive the loan
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rate, PLR. The loan rate mechanism consti-
tutes a price floor for domestic sugar pro-
ducers, maintaining sugar prices at the loan
level, PLR, as in panel (a). With the joint
removal of the TRQ and the sugar loan pro-
gram, the domestic sugar price is free to fall
below the loan rate level. In Figure 1, panel
(b), this situation corresponds to a new price
and trade equilibrium level. In the domestic
market in panel (a), this corresponds to U.S.
imports increasing from Q2Q3, the original
quota QTRQ in panel (b), to Q1Q4, or QFM in
panel (b). These increased U.S. imports lead
to a drop in the domestic price from P1 to P2.
However, P2 is higher than the original world
price of PW.
The authors consider a similar removal of
the TRQ for imported refined, or “white”
sugar. World trade in refined sugar has
increased because of policies in the Euro-
pean Community, the entry of toll refiners,3
and a decrease in freight and refining costs.
Removing the TRQ for refined sugar has
the same qualitative effect as removing the
TRQ for raw sugar: the U.S. price for refined
sugar would decrease with an increase in the
demand for refined sugar imports. A lower
U.S. refined sugar price would then cause a
decrease in the quantity of domestic refined
sugar supplied and a subsequent decline in
the demand for domestic raw sugar.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE MODELING APPROACH
To quantify the welfare gains and losses
from the U.S. sugar program, the follow-
ing steps were used. First, the authors simu-
late the elimination of the program to deter-
mine price and production responses in both
domestic and international sugar markets.
This step involves specifying complete U.S.
and world sweetener models in the presence
of the U.S. sugar TRQ and commodity loan
program. To do this, an international sugar
model was used. This model was developed
by the Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development (CARD) at Iowa State Univer-
sity and for the purpose of this analysis, con-
tains an added multimarket module of the
U.S. domestic sweetener economy as one of
3. Toll refiners export refined sugar processed from
imported raw sugar. See Poonyth et al. (2000) for a
recent analysis of EU sugar policies.
its component countries.4 The multimarket
domestic sweetener model includes such mar-
kets as corn, sugar crops, raw and refined
sugar, food processing, and HFCS.
In the U.S. domestic model, the authors
simulate the sugar program’s elimination by
removing the two TRQs and allowing more
domestic demand to be satisfied by lower-
priced world imports. Simultaneously, as the
U.S. demand for sugar increases, the world
sugar price rises somewhat. The USDA’s
loan program for sugar processors is also
removed, and the domestic market prices
of sugar are allowed to fall below the loan
rate levels. After these reforms, by arbi-
trage, U.S. domestic raw and refined sugar
prices (adjusted for transportation costs)
reach world price levels.
On the domestic supply side, the authors
use the domestic component of the CARD
international sugar model to estimate wel-
fare changes due to the change in the price
of sugar. The new U.S. raw sugar price fil-
ters through the domestic U.S. sugarcane and
sugar beet markets, lowering the prices and
production quantities of these products. By
arbitrage, the new domestic refined sugar
price determines how much of the refined
sugar use will be sourced domestically or
imported. The allocation of domestic produc-
tion between beet processors and raw cane
sugar refiners is determined by equating their
new marginal cost to the new refined sugar
price.
On the demand side, for food proces-
sors that use sweeteners, the relative price of
the HFCS and sugar sweetener has changed.
These sectors adjust their sweetener mix
accordingly, and these adjustments then feed
back into the HFCS and corn markets.
For each of these producing industries, the
authors measure the changes in realized prof-
its that would result from a change in the
quantity demanded and/or the price if the
sugar program were eliminated. Within the
domestic sweetener model, the authors esti-
mate welfare changes for a comprehensive
demand sector, including sugar processors
and refiners, sweetener-using industries, and
the final consumer. The changes in realized
profits resulting from higher sweetener prices
4. A technical appendix describing the sugar portion
of the world CARD model, along with the U.S. multi-
market sweetener module, is available on request from
the authors.
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for sweetener-using food industries, at the
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification
level, are then estimated. The authors spec-
ify the marginal cost of production of these
industries as well as their derived demand
for sweeteners. As part of this specification,
the authors calibrate the marginal cost and
derived demand by assuming food industries
use an initial markup (price-marginal cost) of
20% to price their goods.
As part of this analysis, two polar assump-
tions are considered about the market power
of these industries: full retention of cost sav-
ings by sugar-using food industries, and full
pass-through of cost savings to consumers.
Furthermore, it is assumed that consumers
would be affected by the sugar program’s
elimination through the change in the prices
of both the refined sugar and the food items
purchased containing a significant amount
of sweetener. The authors apply an incom-
plete demand system approach to sweetener-
intensive food and sugar consumption based
on LaFrance (1998) and LaFrance et al.
(2002; LINQUAD),5 and use an exact wel-
fare measure (equivalent variation) to esti-
mate these changes in consumers’ expendi-
tures.6
In the first polar case, consumers’ wel-
fare increases because of lower retail sugar
prices but prices for other food goods remain
unchanged. The food industry, by increasing
its markup, is the major beneficiary from the
reform and absorbs the cost savings. This out-
come yields lower benefits to consumers; it is
the outcome that sugar program proponents
often claim would result if it were ended.
In the second and opposite case, consumers
benefit from lower food prices in addition to
the lower retail sugar price. Food processors
keep their initial markup but pass on to con-
sumers the decrease in marginal cost induced
by lower refined sugar prices. From the per-
5. The LINQUAD is a functional form within the
incomplete demand system approach that provides a
practical model for estimation that reflects theoreti-
cally sound preference ordering. In particular, the LIN-
QUAD quasi-expenditure function produces demand
functions that are linear in deflated income and linear
and quadratic in deflated prices.
6. Equivalent variation is the amount of money that,
when paid to the consumer, achieves the same level
of utility before the change that the consumer would
enjoy with the economic change. Equivalent variation
represents the minimum amount that a consumer would
require to willingly forgo the change.
spective of consumers, this is the most opti-
mistic outcome.
Finally, the authors aggregate all welfare
gains and losses from these groups to esti-
mate the welfare loss (gain) experienced from
eliminating the sugar program as an estimate
of the gain (loss) accruing to each group
from the presence of the program. The differ-
ence between welfare gains and losses is the
net loss to the U.S. economy, which consists
of transfers to foreign producers that result
from artificially high prices for the raw sugar
exported to the United States and economic
inefficiencies (pure efficiency losses). These
inefficiencies result from the use of higher-
cost domestic resources to produce sweeten-
ers (instead of importing lower-cost sugar)
and reduced total sugar consumption.
The model is calibrated to 1998 data,
the most recent available data on sweet-
ener use in the U.S. food industry at the
time of the investigation.7 The authors also
used 1996 data to see how different the wel-
fare estimates would be under a different
price regime. One possible limitation of the
model is that a more general equilibrium
approach of the entire agricultural sector may
have been able to give more long-run effects
by, for example, identifying what alternative
crops would be produced in the absence of
the program or how many producers would
leave the industry entirely. However, general
equilibrium models take a more broad-based
approach, often leaving out important market
details (see Boyd et al., 1996, for an exam-
ple of such a trade-off). The approach is
designed to represent a compromise between
capturing the most important sweetener mar-
ket relationships with the available data and
keeping the model itself tractable.
V. RESULTS
For both 1996 and 1998, the authors com-
pare the actual domestic and world prices for
sugar and HFCS, with the estimated domestic
and world prices if the sugar program were
eliminated. Both the estimated costs of the
sugar program to sweetener users and the
estimated benefits to sugar beet and sugar-
cane producers were higher in 1998 when the
7. The calibration of the model is explained in
a technical appendix, available from the authors on
request.
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TABLE 1
Welfare Gains and Losses from the Sugar
Program, 1996 and 1998
(1999 Million Dollars)
Category 1996 1998
Welfare gains accruing to 788 1,045
producers
Sugarcane producers 241 307
Sugar beet growers 490 650
Sugar beet processors 58 89
HFCS manufacturers and (1) (1)
corn growers
Welfare losses accruing to (1,471) (1,938)
sweetener users
Net loss to the U.S. economy (683) (893)
Economic inefficiencies (273) (532)
Net transfers to foreign suppliers (410) (361)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are economic losses.
Full pass-through is assumed.
difference between the domestic and world
prices for sugar was greater.
As shown in Table 1, the findings suggest
that the sugar program cost domestic sweet-
ener users—sugarcane refiners, food manu-
facturers, and final consumers—about $1.5
billion in 1996 and about $1.9 billion in 1998.
The authors find that the total welfare gains
by domestic sugar beet and sugarcane pro-
ducers were about $788 million in 1996 and
about $1 billion in 1998. About 70% of these
benefits went to sugar beet growers and pro-
cessors; the remaining 30% went to sugar-
cane producers.
The authors also find that HFCS produc-
ers did not receive welfare gains from the
sugar program in either 1996 or 1998, primar-
ily because the possibilities for substitution
between sugar and HFCS are more limited
now than they were in the early 1980s. The
decreased substitution among sweeteners
arises because technological advances have
improved HFCS products and created more
specialized sweetener markets (Evans and
Davis, 1999; Alvarez and Polopolus, 1998).
Thus, HFCS producers would not need to
lower their price (move along their marginal
cost curve) further to remain competitive if
the sugar program were eliminated.8 There-
8. Executives from the Corn Refiners’ Association,
which represents HFCS manufacturers, agree with the
current results. They believe the domestic HFCS market
is decoupled from the domestic sugar market—that is,
fore, the sugar program marginally affects
corn producers. This finding on HFCS and
corn is consistent with the earlier assessment
of Rendleman and Hertel (1993).
This investigation shows that the sugar
program resulted in net losses to the U.S.
economy of about $683 million in 1996
and $893 million in 1998 because total wel-
fare losses exceeded gains. These net losses
included production and consumption inef-
ficiencies of $273 million in 1996 and $532
million in 1998 and transfers of $410 mil-
lion in 1996 and $361 million in 1998 to
foreign countries allocated a portion of the
TRQ for sugar imports to the United States.
These transfers are net of the deadweight loss
induced in the rest of the world by the U.S.
sugar TRQ. Hence, these findings corrobo-
rate findings by Marks (1993) that in net the
rents to foreign owners of U.S. import quotas
are beneficial to the rest of the world. This
remark abstracts from the skewed distribu-
tion of the gross rent transfers to a few coun-
tries caused by the U.S. sugar program. How-
ever, exporters who do not have allocated
quotas may benefit from a more liberalized
trading regime, as they are likely to expand
exports without having to suffer an erosion of
quota rents (USDA, 2001).
The distribution of the welfare losses
resulting from the sugar program among the
sweetener user groups depends on assump-
tions about the extent to which refiners’ and
manufacturers’ cost reductions from eliminat-
ing the sugar program would be passed on to
consumers. If the sugar program were elim-
inated, consumers would evidently benefit.
However, it is difficult to predict the extent
to which and speed with which intermediate
users of sweeteners would pass through lower
sugar costs to final consumers.
Table 2 presents two estimates of how
the benefits of eliminating the sugar pro-
gram might be distributed based on the two
polar cases previously discussed. The first
set of estimates assumes that competition
induces sugar refiners to pass cost reductions
on to final consumers in the form of lower
prices for table sugar but that manufactur-
ers of sugar-containing foods would retain
HFCS prices are no longer linked to sugar prices—and
the soft drink industry has relied on competition among
HFCS manufacturers to minimize its sweetener prices.
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TABLE 2
Estimated Distribution among User Groups of Benefits of Eliminating the
Sugar Program under Different Pass-through Assumptions, 1996 and 1998
(1999 Million Dollars)
1996 1998
Distribution of Partial Full Partial Full
Benefits Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through Pass-through
Final consumers 587 1,434 769 1,960
Food manufacturers 715 (60) 999 (85)
Sugarcane refiners 95 97 61 63
Total 1,397 1,471 1,829 1,938
Notes: The partial pass-through results represent a full pass-through by sugar refiners to food
processors and no pass-through by food processors to consumers. The full pass-through results
assume all cost reductions are passed through to final consumers. Numbers in parentheses are
economic losses.
their cost savings. Under this partial pass-
through assumption, final consumers would
have gained about $587 million using 1996
data and about $769 million using 1998 data
if the sugar program had been eliminated.
Deadweight losses in 1998 would have been
reduced by $416 million as compared to $532
million under full pass-through.
Total welfare gains from eliminating the
sugar program would have been about $1.4
billion in 1996 and $1.8 billion in 1998 if only
sugarcane refiners had passed cost reductions
through to consumers. The different pass-
through assumptions result in slightly differ-
ent estimates of the total gains to sweetener
users if the sugar program were eliminated,
primarily because consumers would increase
their consumption of cheaper sweetener-
intensive foods, hence reducing deadweight
losses further, under the full pass-through
case. The assumption of price discipline in
the refined sugar market is motivated by the
homogeneous nature of white sugar. In con-
trast, when products are highly differentiated
(as many sweetener-containing food products
are), firms may use nonprice forms of com-
petition, such as greater advertising.
The second set of estimates based on
the full pass-through assumption yields an
upper bound estimate of the potential ben-
efits to consumers. Under this assumption,
the authors estimate that the benefits to final
consumers of eliminating the sugar program
would have been about $1.5 billion using 1996
data and about $1.9 billion using 1998 data.
By contrast, if processors of sugar-intensive
goods retained all cost savings from cheaper
refined sugar, final consumers would experi-
ence welfare improvements, which would be
about 40% of the welfare gains under full
pass-through.
Table 3 compares actual sugar prices and
production in 1996 and 1998 with the simu-
lation results, which assume the termination
of the sugar program. If the sugar program
had been eliminated, the domestic price of
raw sugar would have dropped from about
22 cents per pound to about 14.9 cents per
pound in 1996 and to about 12.5 cents per
pound in 1998, with comparable declines
in the wholesale price of domestic refined
sugar. Further, raw sugar imports would have
increased by 1.1 million tons in 1996 and by
1.6 million tons in 1998 with the elimination
of the program with the increased domestic
demand for sugar and the decreased domes-
tic production of sugar beets and sugarcane.
The previous results are short-run ones,
because the elasticities used in the model
reflect short-term rigidities in agricultural
supply both in the United States and in
the rest of the world. Table 4 presents esti-
mates of the welfare changes that would
have resulted from eliminating the sugar pro-
gram in 1998, using larger supply elasticities
than the ones used to obtain the primary
estimates to simulate shorter-term changes.
Supply elasticity estimates are arc elastici-
ties evaluated for 1998 between historical and
postreform values. In particular for the U.S.
market, the short-run domestic supply elas-
ticities were 0.05 for sugarcane and 0.10 for
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TABLE 3
Estimated Effect of Eliminating the Sugar Program on Prices and Production
1996 without the 1998 without the
1996 Actual Sugar Program 1998 Actual Sugar Program
U.S. raw sugar price 22.40 14.91 22.06 12.46
World raw sugar pricea 12.24 13.41 9.68 10.96
U.S. wholesale refined sugar price 29.20 21.77 26.12 16.12
World wholesale refined sugar priceb 16.64 19.77 11.59 14.12
Sugarcane
Acres harvestedc 953,700 941,300 931,500 916,200
Production 29.1 28.7 30.0 29.5
Sugar beets
Acres harvestedc 1,420,100 1,350,300 1,428,300 1,338,600
Production 28.1 26.7 29.9 28.0
Raw sugar imports 2.2 3.3 1.7 3.3
Note: Price is in cents per pound and production and imports are in millions of short tons (raw value).
aThe world price for raw sugar is based on a Caribbean location. As compared with the U.S. price, the world price
does not include 1.5 cents per pound in cost to transport the sugar to New York.
bAs compared with the U.S. price, the world price for refined sugar does not include 2 cents per pound in cost for
transportation.
cAcreage harvested during the previous crop year.
sugar beets and the short-run import supply
elasticity was 7.26, reflecting rigidities in for-
eign agriculture supply. The latter is an excess
supply from the rest of world faced by the
United States, which explains the seemingly
large magnitude.
The authors obtain longer-run welfare
estimates using a double Nerlovian domes-
TABLE 4
Long-Term Welfare Effects of Eliminating
the Sugar Program (1998 Data)
Gain or (Loss)
Category (Million Dollars)
Producers’ losses (1,017)
Sugarcane producers (301)
Sugar beet growers (530)
Sugar beet processors (187)
HFCS manufacturers and corn 1
growers
Gains to sweetener users 1,947
Final consumer 1,953
Food manufacturers (84)
Sugarcane refiners 78
Deadweight loss 572
Transfers to foreign suppliers 358
Net gain to the U.S. economy 930
Notes: These results assume a doubling of supply
responses in agriculture and a full pass-through of pro-
gram costs to final consumers. Numbers in parentheses
are economic losses.
tic supply response with supply elasticities of
0.20 for cane and 0.26 for sugar beets and an
import supply elasticity of 10.17. The results
from this second set of simulations can be
interpreted as the welfare gains and losses
after more time has elapsed for the economy
to adjust to the lower sugar prices that would
result from eliminating the sugar program.
The long-term net gain (all figures in 1999
dollars) for 1998 from eliminating the sugar
program might be higher—$930 million com-
pared with $893 million—with the estimated
reduction in deadweight loss increasing from
$532 to $572 million. This implies that the
net loss to the U.S. economy from maintain-
ing the program may be similarly larger in the
longer term because the actual sugar price
with the program would be compared with
the price after fuller adjustments had been
made. The increase in world prices is mod-
erate relative to the short-term impact of the
policy reform. The raw sugar price increases
by 12.5% on the world market although U.S.
imports of raw sugar increase dramatically to
3.8 million short tons, decreasing domestic
production of crops and raw sugar but boost-
ing the domestic production of refined cane
sugar based on imported raw sugar.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Using a multimarket approach, the authors
assessed the welfare cost of the U.S. sugar
BEGHIN ET AL.: U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM 115
program. The authors investigated the impact
of the program’s removal, accounting for
endogenous world sugar prices, the pass-
through of lower sugar prices in refining to
food processing and to consumers, and the
industrial organization of the food industry.
The latter could limit the pass-through of
cost savings in food processing to consumers.
For 1998 (all figures in 1999 dollars) it
is estimated that with the removal of the
program, cane growers, sugar beet growers,
and beet processors would have lost rents
of about $1 billion. The largest losses would
have occurred in beet production, followed by
sugarcane production. Sweetener users would
have gained about $1.9 billion. The dead-
weight loss or the social cost of the current
sugar program was estimated at around $532
million, and the net loss to the U.S. economy
was $893 million. World prices would have
increased by 13.2% with the removal of the
program. These estimates are quite robust to
changes in assumption regarding the extent
of sugar price pass-through to food retail
prices. However, the distribution of gains is
influenced by whether full pass-through exists
(major gains to final consumers) or does not
exist (major gains to food processors).
These findings are well within the ballpark
of welfare impacts found in previous stud-
ies, which had a less comprehensive approach
to sweetener demand and abstracted from
pass-through issues in food processing (Deva-
doss and Kropf, 1996; Hafi et al., 1993;
Koo, forthcoming; Marks and Maskus, 1993;
Wohlgenant, 1999; Sheales et al., 1999). For
example, Wohlgenant (1999) finds a 10%
increase in world price resulting from a
trade policy reform liberalizing sugar trade
in developed countries. Sheales et al. (1999)
found that removing the U.S. sugar program
would lift world prices by about 17% and
induce a net U.S. welfare gain of $452 mil-
lion, saving U.S. consumers about $1.6 billion
per year (1998–99 dollars).
The finding that corn producers have
become marginal stakeholders in the sugar
program resonates an earlier finding by
Rendleman and Hertel (1993). In this article,
the small gains/losses to corn growers hinge
on the recent evolution in sweetener tech-
nology in food processing. The substitution
between sugar and HFCS has decreased as
sweetener use has become more specialized
by food item. This finding is in contrast to
Gardner (1999), who found that the ethanol
program could raise corn growers’ welfare
considerably. Ethanol represents a demand
for corn comparable in size to corn demand
derived from HFCS production. Gardner’s
(1999) analysis looked at a different policy
(the ethanol subsidy) and, in addition, was
based on a different modeling approach and
used earlier data. The two results provide
an interesting contrast showing how different
distortions in related markets affect the corn
market differently.
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